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Abstract
An existential statement seems to admit of a constructive proof without countable choice only
if the object to be constructed is uniquely determined, or is intended as an approximate solution
of the problem in question. This conjecture is substantiated by re-examining some basic tools
of mathematical analysis from a choice-free constructive point of view, starting from Dedekind
cuts as an appropriate notion of real numbers. By establishing a fairly general version of the
approximate intermediate value theorem, we also indicate that strong continuity is a practicable
substitute for uniform continuity, where a mapping between metric spaces is called strongly
continuous if two subsets of its domain are bounded away from each other whenever so are
their images.
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1. Introduction
Following Beeson [1, p. 25, footnote 16].
Bridges has observed that in general, existence theorems seem to be construc-
tive when the object whose existence is in question is unique. Otherwise put,
non-constructive theorems always involve non-uniqueness. : : : In practice, when-
ever a theorem is known to be non-constructive, the solution whose existence is
non-constructive is also non-unique. Conversely, the di;culty in constructivizing
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certain problems : : : seems to be intimately related to the fact that the solutions
are not known to be (locally) unique.
The purpose of this article is to reconsider Bridges’s conjecture by concentrating on
constructive proofs which, in addition, require as little countable choice as possible.
Making therefore explicit every subsequent invocation of choice principles, we pro-
ceed in the tradition of Bishop’s constructive mathematics ([3]; see also [4,14], and
for a general overview [1,49]). As today advocated by Bridges, Richman, and others
(see, e.g. [36]), this is, roughly speaking, mathematics carried out by intuitionistic
logic, 1 and thus simultaneously generalises classical, constructive recursive, and intu-
itionistic mathematics [14]. According to Bridges [7], constructive analysis in Bishop’s
sense is also suitable as a framework for computational analysis of whatever kind: no
matter whether the logic on which such systems were originally based is the classical
one, the choice of intuitionistic logic automatically reDects their algorithmic character.
Here is our Erst and guarded thesis:
Constructions of uniquely determined solutions presumably do not require choice.
To put it in a rather sloppy way, if there is no choice, then one can dispense with
choice—a case of what is known as Hobson’s rule.
One might be able to by-pass choice also in many—if not all—of the frequent
situations where a particular problem possibly has several solutions:
• uniqueness can be forced by gathering beforehand all the solutions which belong
to each other in a natural way;
• the question of (non)uniqueness can be avoided from the outset by concentrating
on approximate instead of exact solutions.
Postponing examples that illustrate either point, let us notice that the former supports
the claim we made above whereas the latter leads to the second one of our cautious
theses:
Approximate mathematics is closely related with choice-free construction.
A pithier formulation would be that whenever one does not care for a particular choice,
one can do without any choice.
The reservation with which we utter either claim deserves some explication. First,
we are admittedly far from having up our sleeve any precise characterisation of the
existential statements that can(not) be constructively demonstrated without choice. We
have only noticed, and try to exemplify in this article, that any attempt at developing a
choice-free construction is more promising under each of the circumstances mentioned
in the foregoing: that the object one seeks to construct is the only one with the required
property, or intended as an approximation to an ideal solution that might well admit
of no choice-free construction.
1 Anybody questioning whether ex falso quodlibet (EFQ) is really used in constructive practice might
take into account that, even within minimal logic, EFQ is equivalent to (P ∨Q)∧ =Q→P.
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Moreover, we focus on forward results, on the considerable amount that can be
done without choice, rather than elaborating in every case, or in all details, whether
a particular theorem really cannot be proved without choice—in most cases there is
a practicable choice-free substitute anyway. 2 In this vein, we ask the reader to take
phrases such as ‘seems to rely upon choice’ always cum grano salis, maybe in the fairly
weak interpretation that the author has knowledge of neither a choice-free constructive
proof nor a rigorous argument for the necessity of choice. Needless to say, however,
statements of this kind are only made when there are good reasons for so doing, and
exclusively concern what can(not) be done within Bishop’s constructive mathematics.
We are well aware that, on the other hand, many theorems in their original pointwise
versions may require more choice than their translations into pointless frameworks, as
there are locale theory [27] and formal topology (Sambin [41]; a most recent summary
thereof is [42]). Of course, to assert the existence of a point as an ideal object approx-
imated by a sequence of real items needs per se more choice than to construct any
of these approximations, no matter how precise it may be requested. In our opinion,
however, all this may lend additional credit to our second claim.
Let us now brieDy explain the role of choice principles within constructive math-
ematics. It is well-known that the full-blown traditional form of the axiom of choice
can never be transferred to any constructive framework for entailing the certainly non-
constructive principle of tertium nondatur. Diaconescu [20] and Goodman-Myhill [21]
have proved this within intuitionistic topos theory and constructive set theory, respec-
tively, supposing that—as usual in constructive mathematics, too, where equality is
a deEned relation—any mapping f is extensional, that is, x=y⇒f(x)=f(y) for
all x; y. 3
Nevertheless, two special cases have frequently but often tacitly been invoked by
most constructive mathematicians:
Countable choice (CC): For every sequence (An)n∈N of nonempty sets, there is a
sequence (an)n∈N such that an ∈An for every n∈N.
Dependent choice (DC): If A is a nonempty set and S ⊂A×A such that for every
a∈A there is a′ ∈A with (a; a′)∈ S, then for each a0 ∈A there is a sequence (an)n∈N
in A, beginning with this a0, such that (an; an+1)∈ S for all n∈N.
Whereas countable choice is nothing but the countable version of full choice, de-
pendent choice is slightly stronger, but appears to be indispensable wherever inEnite
sequences are ‘constructed’ step-by-step.
2 Of course, all the subtle investigations are to be appreciated by which choice is proved to be necessary
for establishing a particular theorem, and which are often done by exhibiting an appropriate sheaf model for
intuitionistic logic.
3 Let us brieDy summarise this argument, following Bell [2]. For any proposition P, each of the sets
A = {x ∈ {0; 1}|P ∨ x = 0}; B = {x ∈ {0; 1}|P ∨ x = 1};
is nonempty, because 0∈A and 1∈B in any case. If f : {A; B}→A∪B is a choice function for these
data, that is, a=f(A)∈A and b=f(B)∈B, then P ∨ a=0 and P ∨ b=1 or, equivalently, either P or
a=0∧ b=1; whence to establish P ∨¬P we only have to derive ¬P from a=0∧ b=1. To this end,
assume that P obtains; then A= {0; 1}=B and thus a= b by the extensionality of f, a contradiction.
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The justiEcation of either principle common to nearly all schools of constructive
mathematics is based on the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation (BHK) of
any ∀n∃a statement, which says that some algorithm n❀ a has to be in the back-
ground. Moreover, since integers are said to be given as such, not requiring any extra
presentation, every (of course, deterministic) algorithm fed with integer inputs deEnes
a function with integer arguments—in other words, a sequence. 4
In spite of this good argument for accepting countable and dependent choice, there
are just as good reasons for rejecting these putatively constructive choice principles.
The idea to refrain from their use in Bishop-style constructive mathematics was brought
up by Ruitenburg [40] and subsequently put forward by Richman [37]. (One may also
view Hayashi [23] as a forerunner of this development.) Further substantial steps in
the direction of a choice-free constructive mathematics have been made since; see
Richman’s survey article [38] for several case studies showing the virtues of doing
constructive mathematics without countable choice. Let us moreover refer to our forth-
coming paper [45] for a more detailed discussion about the pros and cons of countable
choice in constructive mathematics.
One of the main counterarguments is that the use of choice for solving equations
with parameters seems to hinder the solutions from depending continuously upon the
parameters: 5 choice might enable us to switch between the diPerent branches of the
solution, thus producing points of discontinuity; even ‘choosing’ a Exed branch would
become rather useless as soon as we cross some branching point. If, on the other hand,
the solutions are uniquely determined by the parameters, such discontinuity phenomena
are impossible; moreover, solutions are then functions in the parameters, and thus
most likely to continuously depend on the latter. In constructive mathematics, namely,
4 Nothing but a particular understanding of ∀∃ statements presumably stricter than BHK stands also
behind the argument for the choice principle particular to Martin-LQof’s intuitionistic type theory (ITT); see
pp. 50–52 of [33]. Because the domains of choice functions in ITT are allowed to be sets without any
apparent restriction, it is necessary to stress that in ITT every set has to arrive with special rules for, e.g.,
introduction and elimination (op.cit., p. 24), just as N is formed from the initial element 0 by the successor
operation and embodies the principle of induction. If only in this sense, choice in ITT could be related with
CC, notwithstanding the circumstance that, unlike N, sets in ITT are in general neither denumerable nor
equipped with a genuinely persistent equality.
In view of the fact that ITT is a deEnitely constructive theory, it is recommended to enquire why the
provability of the choice principle belonging to ITT does not conDict with what we have recalled above,
namely, that in certain contexts the full axiom of choice entails the law of excluded middle. What hinders
us from applying the ITT version of choice to the situation of footnote 3 is, Erst, that in ITT a set like
{A; B} cannot be equipped with the extensional equality according to which A and B are identiEed precisely
when they possess the same elements—an essential assumption in footnote 3. Such set formation, however,
becomes possible as soon as ITT is enriched by extensional power sets or ePective quotients, constructors
which indeed infect ITT with classical logic, as has been noticed by Maietti [28] and Maietti-Valentini [29].
Secondly, even if one could impose, in ITT, the extensional equality on {A; B}, one cannot expect that it
would be respected by any mapping like the choice function f—another essential assumption in footnote
3. ITT, namely, was designed as a purely intensional theory, in which there are just as few mappings that
preserve any additional equality relation as there are, in classical mathematics, mappings that respect an
equivalence relation of whatever kind.
5 It is therefore most plausible that topos theory, where cum grano salis everything is continuous, is not
at all a choice-friendly environment.
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solutions have to be algorithms with the parameters as inputs, and functions with
discontinuities cannot be deEned at all. 6 , 7
Why exact solutions might require more choice than approximate ones might be-
come clearer when choice is viewed as a uniformisation principle that transforms any
∀∃ statement into the corresponding ∃∀ statement. To this end, let us consider any
continuous real-valued function f on the unit interval I = [0; 1], and suppose that we
are given the conclusion of the approximate intermediate value theorem in the form
∀n¿ 1∃x ∈ I(|f(x)|¡ 1=n):
From this information we could extract—just by countable choice—a sequence (xn) in
I such that |f(xn)|¡1=n for all n¿1. If only for the moment, let us now disregard that
in general we needed the sequential compactness of I—an essentially nonconstructive
property 8 —for locating a cluster point in I of the sequence (xn). With this proviso,
any such cluster point would constitute a witness for the conclusion of the exact
intermediate value theorem, that there is x∈ I with f(x)= 0, which can also be written
in the less usual but nevertheless equivalent form
∃x ∈ I∀n¿ 1(|f(x)|¡ 1=n):
Taking for granted what shall be argued for in Section 5, that approximate existential
statements seem to allow of choice-free proofs, one may then realise which role choice
plays in this context: to some extent, it is just countable choice that lurks behind the
‘uniform choice’ as which one may view the entire transition from the conclusion of
the approximate to that of the exact intermediate value theorem.
Besides such mathematical considerations of a quite heuristic character, it is in order
to ask how a critical position on countable choice can be justiEed against the back-
ground of theoretical computer science, whose link to constructive mathematics is just
the BHK interpretation. One possible answer is that the usual BHK argument in favour
of countable choice necessarily presupposes that the algorithms under consideration are
assumed to be perfectly deterministic—or, as Richman put it, 9 as soon as one allows
nondeterminism, countable choice goes out through the window. Unless one prefers to
rule out from the beginning every nondeterministic model of computation, the alter-
native of a choice-free constructive mathematics therefore ought to be taken seriously.
Note furthermore that it is approximate construction, to which we will also shift the
emphasis during the course of this article, that is tied in with nondeterminism: as long
6 See Section 4 for some more details on (dis)continuity in Bishop’s constructive analysis and its standard
models.
7 In certain formal systems based on intuitionistic logic, a global continuous function x → y between
(complete) separable metric spaces can be constructed, from the corresponding ∀x∃y statement, provided
that for each x there is exactly one such y. If, however, that universal existential hypothesis lacks this extra
uniqueness condition, then one can still produce a local continuous choice function around each x. For all
this and for further references, let us refer to [1], especially to exercises 4 and 5 of Chapter XIV, Section 4.
8 See, however, Section 4 for the alternative way to deEne compactness as total boundedness plus com-
pleteness, which obtains for intervals like I , and [9,10,26] for investigations of the constructive content of
sequential compactness.
9 Personal communication to the author.
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as the approximations are good ones, it is completely irrelevant which particular one
actually comes out.
2. Completeness of real numbers
There are fewer Cauchy reals than Dedekind reals in the absence of countable
choice, 10 , 11 which is also very likely to be indispensable for proving any completeness
property of Cauchy reals. 12 This situation can already be related with (non)uniqueness
phenomena: although each Cauchy sequence of rationals—or, more generally, of reals
in whatever sense—uniquely determines a Dedekind real to which it converges (see the
proof of Corollary 2), there is a rich choice of rational Cauchy sequences converging
to any given Dedekind real. 13
Dedekind reals, on the other hand, admit almost by deEnition (and without choice)
the following well-known version of order completeness, which seems to be stronger
than sequential completeness in the absence of countable choice.
Least-upper-bound principle (LUB). A nonempty set S of real numbers that is
bounded above possesses a supremum provided that
(*) for all real numbers ¡, either s6 for all s∈ S or ¡r for some r ∈ S.
A supremum of S is a real number  such that
•  is an upper bound of S—that is, s6 for all s∈ S;
• if  is a real number with ¡, then  positively cannot be an upper bound of
S—that is, ¡r for some r ∈ S.
Note that each supremum  of S is a least upper bound in the usual sense—that is, 6
for every upper bound  of S. In particular, ‘the’ supremum of S is uniquely determined
10 According to [14, pp. 138–140], the rationals are embedded as globally constant functions into the
choice-free intuitionistic model of the reals that consists of all the continuous functions on some (classical)
topological space. Because statements about reals are local properties in this model, every continuous function
can there be approximated arbitrarily closely by rationals, whereas any limit of a sequence of rationals has
to be locally constant.
11 One of the anonymous referees pointed out a curiosity appearing in computable analysis as propagated
e.g. in [35]. Although the concepts of computable reals Ta la Cauchy and Ta la Dedekind are there equivalent
to each other [35, p. 17], in the more general setting of computable sequences of reals the Cauchy-
style concept is strictly wider than the Dedekind-style one [35, p. 24]. Perhaps for reasons like this, the
Cauchy approach is given general precedence, in computable analysis, over that due to Dedekind. See also
footnote 12.
12 Unless Cauchy sequences are equipped with Cauchy moduli in the sense of [40,49, Chapter 5]. As
Richman noticed, a Cauchy sequence of Cauchy reals in the modulated context is nothing but a certain
double-indexed sequence of rational numbers. Unlike Cauchy sequences in general, modulated Cauchy se-
quences can therefore hardly be utilised for completing arbitrary metric spaces in the same way in which
the reals are generated from the rationals. (Compare footnotes 13 and 30).
13 Moreover, choice appears to be less evitable also for the treatment of modulated Cauchy reals whenever
one equips them with the usual equality relation or, equivalently, undertakes the usual identiEcation of all
Cauchy sequences of rationals that diPer by a sequence converging to 0: it seems to require countable choice
to pick a true Cauchy sequence of rationals representing a given sequence of such equivalence classes. (We
owe the latter observation to MartUVn EscardUo.)
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up to equality, and we may therefore denote it by sup S. Moreover, condition (*) is even
necessary for the existence of sup S, and it su;ces to check (*) for any ordered pair
¡ of rational numbers. LUB is, of course, equivalent with the analogous statement
about inEma, or greatest lower bounds.
By a Dedekind real we understand a located Dedekind cut in the rationals, that
is, a pair (L; U ) of disjoint nonempty open subsets of Q such that either p∈L or
q∈U for all p; q∈Q with p¡q. The strict partial order of Dedekind reals is given
by (L; U )¡(L′; U ′) if and only if L′\L or, equivalently, U\U ′ is nonempty; the weak
partial order is given by (L; U )6(L′; U ′) if and only if L⊂L′ or, equivalently, U ′⊂U .
Inequality 
= is, of course, the disjunction of ¡ and ¿; equality = as the conjunction
of 6 and ¿ is nothing but the usual extensional equality between pairs of sets.
Referring to Section 4 of [43] for further details, we write R for the set of Dedekind
reals.
In R, however, as in every constructive model of the reals, one ought to be careful
with the use of negation: although it is readily seen that x6y coincides with ¬(x¿y)
and that, consequently, x=y can be identiEed with ¬(x 
=y), it is quite obvious that
x¡y and x 
=y are constructively stronger than ¬(x¿y) and ¬(x=y), respectively.
Let us emphasise that we shall often employ the approximate splitting principle
(†) x ¡ y ⇒ x ¡ z ∨ z ¡ y:
This can easily be justiEed for Dedekind reals and has proved to be a good substitute
for the law of dichotomy z60∨ z¿0, which is nonconstructive in essence. 14 By
the way, (†) implies that if z¡x and x6y, then z¡y—in our view this is the best
characterisation of 6.
Let R be an archimedean ordered Heyting Eeld, that is, a model of Bridges’s [7] set
of axioms minus LUB. These axioms (of course, together with LUB) embody all the
properties of real numbers, such as (†), that are commonly accepted in constructive
mathematics; needless to say, R is a perfect model of those axioms. In particular, any
such R contains Q as a dense subEeld in the sense that for all x; y∈R with x¡y
there is q∈Q such that x¡q¡y.
The following theorem has been pointed out to us by Fred Richman.
Theorem 1. LUB is valid for R if and only if there is a mapping R→R that preserves
¡ and operates as the identity on Q.
Proof. If =(L; U )∈R, then L⊂Q—considered as a subset of R—satisEes condition
(*). Assuming that LUB holds for R, set j()= supL; it is routine to verify that
j :R→R preserves ¡, and that j|Q is the identity. Conversely, if j :R→R is any
such mapping and S ⊂R fulElls the hypotheses of LUB, then S =(LS; US)∈R with
LS , US as the open interiors of
{p ∈ Q | ∃s ∈ S(p ¡ s)}; {q ∈ Q | ∀s ∈ S (s6 q)};
respectively; moreover, j(S) is the supremum of S.
14 See footnote 18.
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Let us underline that we shall utilise the notions of Cauchy sequence and of con-
vergence of sequences in any given model R only when LUB is valid in R, in order
to be able to speak of |x|= max{x;−x} for any x∈R. Indeed, (†) implies (*) for any
S of the form {x1; : : : ; xn} with n¿1; whence max{x1; : : : ; xn} and min{x1; : : : ; xn} exist
in the presence of LUB for all x1; : : : ; xn ∈R with n¿1.
The derivation of sequential completeness from LUB given by Bridges [7] can eas-
ily be rendered choice-free; we nevertheless prove this fact in the way particular to
Dedekind reals, following p. 132 of [43].
Corollary 2. If LUB obtains for R, then every Cauchy sequence in R converges.
Proof. Each Cauchy sequence (xn) in R determines a Dedekind real =(L; U)
with L, U as the open interiors of
{p ∈ Q | ∃N ∈ N∀n¿ N (p ¡ xn)}; {q ∈ Q | ∃N ∈ N∀n¿ N (xn ¡ q)};
respectively. Then (xn) converges to j(), where j :R→R is as in the proof of
Theorem 1.
Corollary 3. Dedekind reals satisfy LUB and form a sequentially complete valued
9eld.
In particular, R is a model of the whole set of Bridges’s axioms [7], including LUB.
All these results can equally be applied to the formal reals presented by Negri and
Soravia [34]—that is, real numbers in formal topology. Very roughly speaking, a formal
real  consists of pairs of rationals p; q with p¡q such that the open intervals ]p; q[
form a neighbourhood base of . It is easily checked that the natural bijection between
formal and Dedekind reals is an order isomorphism (compare [34], Sections 5 and 9);
whence LUB applies to formal reals, too. 15
Every model akin to formal reals therefore appears to be as suitable as Dedekind reals
for a choice-free approach; 16 however, if only for the sake of a uniform presentation,
we have chosen to concentrate on the latter: from now on, we understand by a real
number always a Dedekind real.
3. Exact intermediate value theorems
By an interval without further speciEcation we understand, in addition to ] − ∞;
+∞[=R, any subset of R that equals a member of the following list for
15 In order to avoid impredicativity, one might interpret the set S in LUB as a family indexed by a
su;ciently neat set, just as in Proposition 6.3 of [34] which is LUB without the hypothesis (*) and thus
only provides a so-called weak formal real as supremum. For a choice-free proof, however, of the sequential
completeness of formal reals not employing their weak version, see ibid., Theorem 8.6.
16 Notwithstanding the fact that a rather general choice principle is a built-in tool of formal topology, as
of ITT; see footnote 4.
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some a; b∈R:
]a; b] = {x ∈ R | a ¡ x 6 b}; ]−∞; b] = {x ∈ R | x 6 b};
]a; b[= {x ∈ R | a ¡ x ¡ b}; ]−∞; b[= {x ∈ R | x ¡ b};
]a; b] = {x ∈ R | a6 x 6 b}; ]a;+∞[= {x ∈ R | a6 x};
]a; b[= {x ∈ R | a6 x ¡ b}; ]a;+∞[= {x ∈ R|a ¡ x}:
Let a¡b be real numbers, and recall the
Intermediate value theorem (IVT). If f : [a; b]→R is a continuous 17 function with
f(a)606f(b), then f(x)= 0 for some x∈ [a; b].
It being almost folklore that IVT is nonconstructive unless some hypotheses are
added, 18 it is noteworthy that the well-known example of a piecewise linear function
f that ‘balks’ at IVT is nondecreasing in the sense that x¡y⇒f(x)6f(y) for all
x; y (see, e.g. [49, 6.1.2]).
However, the classical interval halving argument still applies to functions mapping
rationals to rationals, such as polynomials with rational coe;cients, for which even
countable choice is unnecessary because the rationals are totally ordered. 19
Theorem 4. IVT is valid for every pointwise continuous f : [a; b]→R with f(Q)⊂Q,
provided that either a; b∈Q or f(a)¡0¡f(b).
Proof. First, note that if f(a)¡0¡f(b), then f(a′)¡0¡f(b′) for some a′; b′ ∈Q∩
]a; b[; in particular, we may assume that a; b∈Q. Then there is a uniquely determined
nested sequence of nonempty compact intervals In⊂ [a; b] with rational endpoints, be-
ginning with I0 = [a; b], such that In+1 is the left (right) half of In whenever f(cn)¿0
(¡0), where cn ∈Q is the midpoint of In. In particular (In) shrinks to a real number x
with f(x)= 0; note that f changes sign within each In.
The putatively most general constructive version of IVT is the one for functions f
that are locally nonconstant, which is to say that whenever a6x¡y6b and t ∈R, then
f(z) 
= t for some z ∈ [x; y]. Including the extensive class of nonconstant real-analytic
functions, this extra condition rules out those ‘balking’ functions which are locally
constant somewhere, but still allows functions to possess multiple zeros: consider, for
instance, f(x)= x2−c for c¿0. Accordingly, dependent choice appears to be necessary
for proving this form of IVT by approximate interval halving as, e.g., in [49, 6.1.5].
17 For not blindly following the supposition that any pointwise continuous function on [a; b] is uniformly
continuous, we shall subsequently make explicit when pointwise continuity su;ces. See Section 4 for more
details on the understanding of continuity particular to constructive analysis.
18 IVT as it stands implies the law of dichotomy (DICH) for Dedekind reals, which in turn entails what
Bishop named the ‘lesser limited principle of omniscience’ (LLPO), a classically valid statement provably
false in constructive recursive and in intuitionistic mathematics; see [14, pp. 53, 56, 108]. In fact, under CC,
the statements IVT, DICH, and LLPO are equivalent [14, pp. 14, 56].
19 We owe this observation to Helmut Schwichtenberg.
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The same method of proof was used beforehand (e.g., on p. 40 of [4]) for the IVT
for strictly increasing functions 20 —that is, functions f such that x¡y⇒f(x)¡f(y)
for all x; y. Since strictly increasing functions have at most one zero, the reader might
already expect that countable choice is dispensable for this particular type of func-
tions. Indeed, a choice-free proof by interval tesselating has been noted by Richman
([39, Theorem 4]); let us nevertheless provide a more order-theoretic proof.
Theorem 5. IVT obtains for every strictly increasing pointwise continuous f.
Proof. Having proved that S = {x∈ [a; b] |f(x)60} possesses a supremum, we can
routinely verify that sup S ∈ [a; b] and f(sup S)= 0. To check the hypothesis (*) of
LUB, note Erst that if ¡, then either ¡a∨ b¡, in which case we are done,
or a¡∧ ¡b and thus max{a; }¡min{b; }; in particular, we may assume that
; ∈ [a; b]. For then f()¡f(), so either f()¡0 or f()¿0; in the former case,
f(′)¡0, and thus ′ ∈ S, for some ′ ∈ ]; b], whereas  is an upper bound of S in
the latter case.
Another property of functions is only at Erst glance a candidate for IVT, namely,
f(x)¡f(y)⇒ x¡y for all x; y; this property was named antidecreasing by Mandelk-
ern [31]. 21 Any nondecreasing function f is antidecreasing provided that f is also
strongly extensional, which is to say that f(x) 
=f(y)⇒ x 
=y for all x; y; needless to
say, each antidecreasing function is strongly extensional. Since, however, all pointwise
continuous functions are strongly extensional, 22 IVT for antidecreasing functions is
equivalent to the nonconstructive form of IVT for nondecreasing functions.
It is still tempting to generalise the choice-free approach to IVT for strictly injective
functions, 23 , by which we mean those f with x 
=y⇒f(x) 
=f(y) for all x; y. Of
course, each strictly increasing function is strictly injective, and each strictly injective
nondecreasing function is strictly increasing. Although the status of IVT for strictly
injective f is not clariEed yet, there only seems to be little gain of knowledge in any
such generalisation of Theorem 5.
In the presence of dependent choice, each strictly injective pointwise continuous f is
either strictly increasing or else strictly decreasing, depending on whether f(a)¡f(b)
or f(a)¿f(b), respectively, as a consequence of our overall hypothesis a¡b. To see
this, note Erst that strictly injective functions are locally nonconstant; whence IVT (that
with choice) applies also to strictly injective functions.
Next, suppose that a pointwise continuous function f : [a; b]→R is strictly injective
such that f(a)¡f(b), and let x; y∈ [a; b] with x¡y. In view of f(x) 
=f(y) because
of f being strictly injective, f(x)¡f(y) can be reduced to f(x)6f(y). To prove the
20 Notwithstanding both sources just referred to, for proving IVT for locally nonconstant or strictly increas-
ing functions one does not really have to suppose that f(a)¡0¡f(b).
21 Bridges-Mahalanobis [12,13], who simply called it increasing, have demonstrated that this property
allows one to detect the possible discontinuities of a given function, and to extend the domain of any partial
function to all points where the left-hand and right-hand limit exist and coincide.
22 See also Ishihara [24] for the relation between continuity and strong extensionality.
23 Note that this property is constructively stronger (and thus more appropriate) than its contrapositive
f(x)=f(y)⇒ x= y for all x; y.
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latter, assume that its contrary obtains—that is, f(x)¿f(y). Then f(x)¿f(z)¿f(y)
for some z ∈ [x; y]—with, e.g., f(z)= (f(x) + f(y))=2—whose existence is granted
by IVT. Note also that x¡z¡y for any such z, in virtue of the strong extension-
ality of f as a pointwise continuous function. By (†), moreover, either f(x)¿f(b)
or f(b)¿f(z); whence either f(x)¿f(b)¿f(a) or f(b)¿f(z)¿f(y). One more
application of IVT produces, in the former case, c∈ [a; x] with f(c)=f(b), and, in
the latter case, d∈ [y; b] with f(d)=f(z); whence either case conDicts with the strict
injectivity of f.
4. Uniform continuity revis(it)ed
The attentive reader might already have wondered why we speak of pointwise
continuous functions on compact intervals, bearing in mind the
Uniform continuity principle (UC). Every pointwise continuous function on [0; 1]
is uniformly continuous.
In fact, UC is also constructively an immediate consequence of the
Heine–Borel covering principle (HB). Every open covering of [0; 1] admits of a
subcovering consisting of 9nitely many elements.
Now HB and thus UC are valid in classical mathematics, but also in intuitionis-
tic mathematics: HB follows from the principles crucial for Brouwer’s mathematical
thinking, namely, continuous choice and the fan theorem. 24 On the other hand, UC
and thus HB are refuted in constructive recursive mathematics by means of Specker’s
sequence. In constructive mathematics Ta la Bishop without any extra assumptions, we
therefore cannot expect to prove UC, let alone HB. For more details see
[14, especially Chapter 6].
To properly deEne compactness, another of the classically equivalent deEnitions was
chosen by Bishop, that of total boundedness plus completeness. This is constructively
satisEed by [0; 1], whereas HB has more or less been dropped from Bishop-style con-
structive mathematics. 25 Continuity, on the other hand, was interpreted by Bishop in
his very own way [4, p. 3]:
The concept of a pointwise continuous function is not relevant; a continuous func-
tion is one that is uniformly continuous on compact intervals.
A more formal deEnition of continuity in the same vein is in fact given ibid. on p. 38.
If only by cautious conceptual choices like this, the constructive mathematics founded
by Bishop can serve as a common theory for its three main models, which indeed are
mutually incompatible with particular respect to continuity questions. In addition to
the uniformity problem outlined above, let us recall that in intuitionistic and con-
structive recursive mathematics every function on an interval is pointwise continuous
(see again [14, Chapter 6]). Unlike the well-known situation in classical mathematics,
24 In the presence of the former, the latter is actually equivalent with HB.
25 Where nevertheless a rather logical investigation of HB, UC, and related principles has been undertaken
recently [10,26].
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discontinuous functions with continuous domains thus cannot be deEned in con-
structive mathematics.
Bishop’s deEnition of continuity is of particular interest when it comes to questioning
countable choice. In [39], Richman put it as follows:
One feature of the pointwise approach [to continuity] is the prominent role played
by countable choice. If, like me, you prefer to reject countable choice, then you
seem to be forced to use Bishop’s approach. Thus, if Bishop’s approach is the
right one, then we have another argument for rejecting countable choice: by so
doing you are forced to do the right thing.
Needless to say, pointwise continuity is still a quite common notion and therefore
worth being investigated. Moreover, it happens to be of some interest in a choice-
free environment, too, at least when unique existence is guaranteed (see Section 3).
We feel also somewhat uncomfortable with Bishop’s trick of ‘solving’ a problem by
choosing the ‘right’ deEnition, a method which is deEnitely not appropriate for a theory
as general as contemporary Bishop-style constructive mathematics.
Let us sketch a recent development in constructive topology that might constitute a
way out of this ‘discontinuous’ situation. Abstracting from the relation “dist(x; S)¿r
for some r¿0” between points x and subsets S of some metric space, Bridges and VVˆtZ[a
(Dediu) have begun to establish apartness relations as a basis for general constructive
topology [19,50]. The next step in this direction, apartness relations between pairs of
subsets [47,48], turned out to be intimately related with uniform structures. In spite
of—or just because—being therefore close to uniform continuity, the corresponding
notion of strong continuity happens to be of considerable interest even in the ‘old’
context of mappings between metric spaces.
More speciEcally, in [47] two subsets of a metric space (M; d) are said to lie apart
from each other, for short A ./B, whenever there is some r¿0 with dist(A; B)¿r, that
is, d(x; y)¿r for all x∈A and y∈B. Any mapping f :M→M ′ between metric spaces
is then called strongly continuous if
f(A) ./ f(B)⇒ A ./ B;
for all A; B⊂M . 26 The weaker point-set version of strong continuity (that requiring
mappings to reDect only the point-subset apartness relation) is equivalent to pointwise
continuity [50].
It can easily be seen that full strong continuity as deEned before follows from, and
is classically equivalent to, uniform continuity; the former, however, presumably is
constructively weaker than the latter [11], even in the presence of countable choice.
Curiously, every strongly continuous mapping with totally bounded domain is uni-
formly continuous [25]. Note that the proof of this variant of UC, although yet relying
26 It is to be admitted that, in general, to speak of strong continuity involves some second-order
quantiEcation—that is, a quantiEcation over subsets of the given set M . This putative defect could be
healed by concentrating on a relatively harmless family of subsets that still is ample enough to work with,
or even by completely reversing—e.g., following formal topology [42]—the traditional precedence of points
over subsets.
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on dependent choice, neither invokes additional principles from intuitionistic and re-
cursive mathematics nor requires the domain of the mapping under consideration to be
complete.
Besides thus being a good candidate for the role of substitute for pointwise continu-
ity, strong continuity turns out to work as well as uniform continuity for approximately
solving equations without countable choice: all the approximate intermediate value the-
orems of Section 5 can be proved with the usual hypothesis of uniform continuity
replaced by that of strong continuity. This almost exclusive use of strong instead of
uniform continuity is one of the advances of the present article as compared with its
predecessor [44].
5. Some approximate analysis
Throughout this section, let (M; d) be a metric space, and a; b∈M . Recall the
Approximate intermediate value theorem (aIVT). If f :M→R is a function with
f(a)606f(b), then for every &¿0 there is x∈M with |f(x)|¡&.
We will subsequently specify continuity conditions on f and geometric or topological
properties of M that ensure the validity of aIVT. Let us stress that we shall frequently
but tacitly invoke the approximate splitting principle (†) mentioned in Section 2.
Before all this, it is in order to point out some modiEcations of aIVT. First, although
there might well be no path in M that connects a and b, some x as in aIVT can at
least be found on any such path: as we will see later on, aIVT obtains for functions
on intervals. Next, the statement
if f :M→R is a function and t ∈R with f(a)6t6f(b), then for every &¿0
there is x∈M with |f(x)− t|¡&
is equivalent to aIVT with f − t in place of f.
Last but not least, aIVT can be rephrased in terms of convexity rather than order:
under certain circumstances we may replace 0∈ [f(a); f(b)] by 0∈ 〈f(a); f(b)〉 as the
general hypothesis of aIVT, where, as in any normed space, the line segment joining
two points u; v, or the convex hull of u and v, is deEned as
〈u; v〉 = {(1− t)u+ tv | t ∈ [0; 1]}:
To this end, let us contemplate the implication
if f :M→R is a function and t ∈ [0; 1] with 0= (1 − t)f(a) + tf(b), then for
every &¿0 there is x∈M with |f(x)|¡&,
and assume its antecedent to be valid. In view of (†), for any &¿0 either |f(a) −
f(b)|¡& or |f(a)−f(b)|¿0. In the former case, |f(a)|¡& because f(a)= t(f(a)−
f(b)); whence we may suppose the latter case. Then the existence of some x∈M
with |f(x)|¡& amounts to the conclusion of aIVT with g − t in place of f, where
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g=’ ◦ f with
’ : R→ R; y → f(a)− y
f(a)− f(b) :
(Note that g − t inherits from f any reasonable continuity property, since ’ is even
Lipschitz continuous.) In fact, g(a)= 06t61= g(b), and
|f(x)|¡ &⇔ |g(x)− t|¡ &|f(a)− f(b)|
for any x ∈ M and &¿0, because
|f(a)− f(b)| · |g(x)− t| = |f(a)− f(x)− t(f(a)− f(b))| = |f(x)|;
again in virtue of t(f(a)− f(b))=f(a).
Let us point out that the hypotheses 0∈ [f(a); f(b)] and 0∈ 〈f(a); f(b)〉 cannot be
deduced from each other in general. Indeed, what we have for any compact interval
[u; v] with u; v∈R is only that 〈u; v〉⊂ [u; v] whenever u6v; more generally, all inter-
vals are convex (see Proposition 6 below). On the other hand, it is not clear how to
show 〈u; v〉 ⊃ [u; v] unless u¡v or u= v.
Recall that any subset of a normed space is convex precisely when it contains the
convex hull of any pair of its elements. It is almost needless to say that convex hulls
are convex. The following proposition shows that Mandelkern’s suspicion ([32, 10.12])
that compact intervals constructively cannot be proved to be convex is unjustiEed.
Proposition 6. Every interval is convex.
Proof. Let x; y∈R and z ∈ 〈x; y〉—that is, z=(1 − t)x + ty= x + t(y − x) for some
t ∈ [0; 1]. First, assuming that x; y¿u for any u∈R, let us show z¿u by verifying w¿u
for every w∈R with w¿z. By (†) and w¿z, either w¿x or x¿z. In the former case,
w¿u by way of x¿u. In the latter case, t(y − x)¡0 and thus y − x¡0 (because
t¿0); whence t(y − x)¿y − x (because t61). Therefore z¿y, so w¿u in virtue of
w¿z and y¿u.
Next, supposing that x; y¿u for any u∈R, let us prove z¿u as follows. By (†) and
x¿u, either x¿z or z¿u. In the latter event we are done, whereas in the former we
can proceed as above to get z¿y and thus, by way of y¿u, also z¿u. In a completely
analogous manner one can prove, for any v∈R, that if x; y6v, then z6v, and that
if x; y¡v, then z¡v.
For bounded intervals that contain either both endpoints or none of them, convexity
could alternatively be deduced from the easy observation that closed and open balls in
any normed space are convex.
In [30,49, p. 381], a topological space is called connected if U ∩V is nonempty
whenever U ∪V is an open covering of the whole space with U and V being nonempty.
The following fact was noted by Mandelkern in [32, 10.3], who in case M = [0; 1]
ascribes it to Ray Mines and Fred Richman [31]; essentially the same idea is buried
in the proof of [49, 6.1.4].
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Theorem 7. aIVT is valid for every pointwise continuous f provided that M is
connected.
Proof. Since M =U ∪V for the open sets
U = {x ∈ M |f(x) ¡ &}; V = {x ∈ M |f(x) ¿ −&}
with a∈U , b∈V , there is, by hypothesis, some x∈U ∩V ; in other words, |f(x)|¡&.
At least as proved in [30], Theorem 2 and in [49, 6.1.3], the connectedness of
any interval seems to rely on dependent choice; note that this existential statement
is essentially lacking uniqueness. The direct proof of aIVT for uniformly continuous
functions on compact intervals can nevertheless be rendered choice-free; it su;ces to
substitute the approximate interval-halving argument (the one still used on p. 40 of
[4]) by interval tesselating. 27
Departing from this idea, we subsequently generalise aIVT in two directions: the
uniform continuity of f will be relaxed to strong continuity (see Section 4), and M
is allowed to be a fairly general metric space only satisfying some relatively weak
connectivity–convexity conditions of a genuinely approximate character.
Let us call M almost connected whenever, for all nonempty subsets R and S of M ,
if M =R∪ S, then for every &¿0 there are r; s∈M with r ∈R, s∈ S, and d(r; s)¡&.
Proposition 8. Every connected metric space M is almost connected.
Proof. Given nonempty subsets R and S of M , consider the open neighbourhoods
U = {x ∈ M |d(x; r) ¡ &=2 for some r ∈ R};
V = {x ∈ M |d(x; s) ¡ &=2 for some s ∈ S};
of R and S, respectively. If, in addition, R∪ S =M , then also U ∪V =M . By
hypothesis, there is x∈U ∩V ; whence there are r ∈R and s∈ S with d(x; r)¡&=2
and d(x; s)¡&=2, respectively, and thus d(r; s)¡&.
Theorem 9. aIVT obtains for every strongly continuous f provided that M is almost
connected.
Proof. For any given &¿0, set
A = {x ∈ M |f(x) ¡ −&=2}; B = {x ∈ M |f(x) ¿ &=2}:
Since f is strongly continuous and dist(f(A); f(B))¿&, there is .¿0 with dist(A; B)¿
.. On the other hand, consider
R = {x ∈ M |f(x) ¡ &}; S = {x ∈ M |f(x) ¿ −&};
27 We learned this from yet unpublished lecture notes by Helmut Schwichtenberg.
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for which a∈R, b∈ S, and M =R∪ S. By the almost connectedness of M , there are
r ∈R and s∈ S with d(r; s)¡.. If f(r)¡ − &=2 and f(s)¿&=2, then r ∈A and s∈B,
which yields a contradiction. Hence either f(r)¿− & and thus |f(r)|¡&, or f(s)¡&
and thus |f(s)|¡&.
In [14, Chapter 6, Problem 9], a metric space M is called stepwise connected if for
all a; b∈M and &¿0 there are c0; : : : ; cn ∈M such that c0 = a, cn= b, and d(ck ; ck−1)¡&
for k =1; : : : ; n; in other words, a and b can be connected by a chain of Enitely many
points in M with mesh ¡&.
In the light of Proposition 8 and the oscillating constructive character of HB (see
Section 4), one may regard Proposition 10 below as a good Bishop-style approximation
of Grayson’s Theorem 4.1.3 of [22]. The latter says that, for every metric space that
is compact in the sense of HB, connectedness follows from stepwise connectedness;
a close look at the proof of that theorem even shows that any such metric space is
connected if—and, in virtue of Proposition 8, only if—it is almost connected.
Proposition 10. Every stepwise connected metric space is almost connected.
Proof. Let M be a stepwise connected metric space. For any pair R; S ⊂M with
M =R∪ S, assume that R and S are nonempty, and pick a∈R, b∈ S. For each &¿0,
there are, by hypothesis, c0; : : : ; cn ∈M with a= c0, b= cn, and d(ck ; ck−1)¡& for all
k. Since c0 ∈R, cn ∈ S, and ck ∈R or ck ∈ S for any k, one can End some k such that
r= ck−1 ∈R and s= ck ∈ S. By construction, d(r; s)¡&; whence M is almost connected.
The technique employed in the proof of Proposition 10 has already been used by
Bridges for showing Lemma 5 of [5], which in ePect says that every line segment in
a normed space is almost connected. In the following, we can do somewhat better:
convex sets will prove to be stepwise connected (Propositions 11 and 16 below).
Recall that a metric space M is called pathwise connected if for all a; b∈M there
is a path in M that connects a and b, i.e., a uniformly continuous 28 mapping
0 : [0; 1]→M with 0(0)= a and 0(1)= b. Convex subsets of normed spaces are pathwise
connected.
Proposition 11. Every pathwise connected metric space M is stepwise connected.
Proof. Let 0 : [0; 1]→M be a path connecting a; b∈M . For any &¿0 there is .¿0
such that d(0(r); 0(s))¡& for all r; s∈ [0; 1] with |r − s|¡.. Construct a tesselation
0= t0¡ · · ·¡tn=1 of [0; 1] with mesh ¡.; then the chain 0(t0); : : : ; 0(tn) in M has
mesh ¡&.
For the time being, we do not dare to ask under which circumstances the completion
of a stepwise connected metric space is pathwise connected.
28 In view of the uniform continuity principle for strongly continuous functions mentioned in Section 4,
this requirement could be relaxed to ‘strongly continuous’.
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Corollary 12. aIVT obtains for every strongly continuous f provided that M is a
pathwise or stepwise connected metric space, a convex subset of a normed space,
or an interval.
As a digression, let us now provide some conditions under which the converse of
Proposition 10 obtains.
Proposition 13. Each almost connected metric space M is stepwise connected
provided that M can be covered by 9nitely many stepwise connected subspaces
M1; : : : ; Mm.
Proof. We may assume without loss of generality that m¿1. Whenever we are given
a; b∈M and &¿0, let us also suppose that a∈M1 and b∈Mm. Since M =R∪ S for
R=M1∪ · · · ∪Mm−1 and S =Mm, there are r ∈R and s∈ S with d(r; s)¡&; pick then
k¡m with r ∈Mk . Unless k =1, replace R and S by
⋃
k =i¡m Mi and Mk ∪Mm, respec-
tively, and repeat the process.
After Enitely many such invocations of the hypothesis that M is almost connected,
we get r1; s1; : : : ; rn; sn ∈M with n¡m, r1 ∈M1, sn ∈Mm, d(ri; si)¡& for 16i6n, and so
that for each 16i¡n there is ‘(i) with si; ri+1 ∈M‘(i). By the stepwise connectedness
of all the Mi, one can End chains with mesh ¡& that consist of Enitely many elements
of M1, each M‘(i), and Mm, respectively, so that they connect a with r1, each si with
ri+1, and sn with b, respectively. The appropriate juxtaposition of all these chains yields
a chain with mesh ¡& that connects a with b.
Recall that the path component of any point x in a metric space consists of all
points in M which can be connected with x by a path in M . Every path component is
pathwise connected.
Corollary 14. Each almost connected metric space that consists of 9nitely many path
components is stepwise connected.
Recall that a metric space M is totally bounded if, for every &¿0, M can be covered
by Enitely many open balls of radius & with centres in M . In view of Proposition 8,
Proposition 15 below generalises Grayson’s Remark 4.1.2b in [22], whose essence is
that every totally bounded connected metric space is stepwise connected.
Proposition 15. Every totally bounded almost connected metric space M is stepwise
connected.
Proof. For any &¿0, there are x1; : : : ; xn ∈M such that M =M1 ∪ · · · ∪Mn where each
Mi is the open ball with radius & around xi. We now can proceed in a way analogous
to the proof of Proposition 13, observing that any pair y; z ∈Mi can be connected by
the chain y; xi; z in Mi with mesh ¡&.
One could alternatively deduce Proposition 15 from Proposition 13 by once more
observing that, in any normed space, open (and closed) balls are convex.
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In [32, 10.9] a metric space M is called nearly convex whenever, for any x; y∈M
and 4; 5¿0, if d(x; y)¡4+5, then there is z ∈M such that d(x; z)¡4 and d(y; z)¡5.
What has been indicated ibid., 10.13a for subsets of R holds in general: convex subsets
of normed spaces are nearly convex.
Proposition 16. Every nearly convex metric space M is stepwise connected.
Proof. For any a; b∈M and &¿0, set c0 = a, cn= b, and 0 =d(c0; cn). Either 0¡&
and we are done, or 0¿&=2. In the latter event, there is c1 ∈M with d(c0; c1)¡& and
d(cn; c1)¡0 − &=2= 1. By repeating this process with c0, 0 substituted by c1, 1,
we get—after a Enite number of steps—a chain c0; : : : ; cn in M with mesh ¡&.
Again in [32, 10.9], any subset M of R is called paraconvex whenever, for any
x; y∈M and z ∈R, if x6z6y, then z ∈M . According to op.cit., 10.13b, paraconvex
subsets of R are nearly convex. In other words, the concept of near convexity subsumes
those of paraconvexity and convexity, which, for arbitrary subsets of R, are incompa-
rable with each other [32, 10.10, 10.11]. Intervals, on the other hand, are convex and
paraconvex.
Corollary 17. aIVT is valid for every strongly continuous f whenever M is a nearly
convex metric space, a convex subset of a normed space, a paraconvex subset of
R, or an interval.
Like Corollary 17, all instances of aIVT proved in this paper do not require the
metric space M to be complete, let alone compact. Moreover, each of the approxi-
mate notions ‘almost connected’, ‘stepwise connected’, and ‘nearly convex’ transmits
to dense subsets of M ; in particular, aIVT obtains also for densely deEned strongly
continuous functions on intervals, say. Note that Q as a dense subset of R is nearly
convex, but not connected:
√
2 cuts Q into two open halves. Accordingly, aIVT works
well for strongly continuous functions on the rationals which not necessarily have
rational values (cf. Theorem 4).
In view of Proposition 16, one might suspect that the notions ‘stepwise connected’
and ‘nearly convex’ coincide with each other, but by removing the hypotenuse from
some rectangular triangle one gets a stepwise connected space that is not nearly con-
vex. However, following the proof of [32, Theorem 10.7], where connectedness is
supposed instead of almost connectedness, we realise that for subsets of the line all
three approximate notions are equivalent.
Proposition 18. Every almost connected subset of R is nearly convex.
Proof. Let M be an almost connected subset of R. For all x; y∈M and 4; 5¿0 with
|x − y|¡4 + 5, either |x − y|¡min{4; 5}, in which case we are done (for instance,
by setting z=(x+ y)=2), or x 
=y; whence we may assume that x¡y. Pick &¿0 with
y − x¡(4− &) + (5 − &) and &¡min{4; 5}, and set
R = M∩]−∞; x + 4− &[; S = M∩]y − 5 + &;+∞[:
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Since M =R∪ S (because y − 5 + &¡x + 4 − &), there are, by hypothesis, r ∈R and
s∈ S with |r − s|¡&. For z= r (or, equally, for z= s), we then have z ∈M ∩ ]y − 5;
x + 4[; whence |x − z|¡4 and |y − z|¡5.
Corollary 19. Near convexity, stepwise connectedness, and almost connectedness are
equivalent properties of any subset of R.
Again, we hesitate to conjecture something like that the closure of any such subset
of R is an interval.
6. Concluding remarks
Although the notion of a strictly increasing function is—at least for practical purposes
—not as restrictive as it might seem to be, the corresponding IVT (without choice)
is less satisfying than that for locally nonconstant functions (with choice): unlike the
latter, the former can hardly be extended to functions on arbitrary normed spaces, let
alone metric spaces. 29 The case is just as for Cauchy sequences versus Dedekind cuts
in the rationals: 30 general euclidean space lacks the additional structure of the linear
continuum that is given by order.
In other words, there literally is ‘more choice’ in higher dimensions, for instance, of
geometrical directions, and these choices can hardly be by-passed unless one abolishes
or neglects them by forcing the solutions to be unique or by concentrating on approx-
imate solutions, respectively. As we have seen in Section 5, however, the (genuinely
choice-free) approximate form of IVT is from the very outset not restricted to functions
of a single real variable.
The phenomenon just mentioned can already be observed in the case of two dimen-
sions. When dealing with complex numbers, one is often inclined to use polar coor-
dinates z= |z| exp(i arg z), and every complex number z 
=0 can indeed be equipped
with an argument arg z by means of the (choice-free) IVT for strictly increasing func-
tions. However, no argument of that kind can be constructed for arbitrary—possibly
vanishing—complex numbers z: otherwise every real number, even those close to 0,
would allow for a sign ±1, a behaviour which corresponds to the nonconstructive
dichotomy principle for real numbers. 31 The case is as for the bare IVT without
any extra assumptions, a theorem that would, of course, su;ce for a general polar
29 Bridges [6] has generalised the latter version of IVT to functions on normed spaces.
30 As Richman noticed, one might well proceed from the rationals to the reals by a method such as
Dedekind cuts, by which one can hardly complete arbitrary metric spaces—to speak about a metric requires
anyhow a notion of real number given in advance, unless one simultaneously completes the domain and the
range of the metric.
31 See Bridges-Dediu [8] for a direct proof of the facts that the existence of polar coordinates implies
LLPO, and that polar coordinates with the additional property ei arg z =1⇒ z =0 even enable one to infer
the stronger ‘limited principle of omniscience’ (LPO).
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decomposition: zeros of possibly locally constant functions cannot be isolated
constructively.
How, then, do we calculate square roots of arbitrary complex numbers, a purpose for
whose real counterpart complex numbers were designed in their origin? Of course, one
easily recollects, departing from i2 =−1, the well-known formulas giving both square
roots of a complex number z= x+ iy under the precondition that z 
=0—that is, x 
=0
or y 
=0. Problems arise, just as for polar coordinates, only in the neighbourhood of 0:
in order to locate a single root of a complex number z close to 0, one has to choose
between the two possible roots as soon as z 
=0 turns out to be the case—in other
words, choice has to enter the stage.
Curiously, a rather speciEc (and classically valid) countable choice principle pre-
sented in [16] happens to su;ce for constructing a square root of an arbitrary complex
number z without making use of the alternative z 
=0∨ z=0, namely,
Weak countable choice (WCC). For every sequence (An)n∈N of nonempty
sets at most one of which is not a singleton, there is a choice sequence an ∈An
(n∈N).
Roughly speaking, WCC enables the extraction of a choice sequence provided
that there is at most one true choice, no matter at which stage this occurs, if at
all.
More generally, an entirely choice-free constructive proof of the fundamental the-
orem of algebra has been given by Richman in [37]. His construction produces as
output arbitrarily precise approximations of the whole multiset of roots of any input
polynomial, from which data one can extract a single root by means of WCC (see,
again [16] for the latter method). Note that Richman could only get rid of countable
choice by gathering all roots of some polynomial together, by thus forcing the solution
in question to be uniquely determined, and by concentrating on how to approximate it.
As soon as one leaves, however, the environment characterised by uniqueness and ap-
proximation, one needs at least some choice—namely, WCC—in order to get a single
and exact root.
After all this, one might still suspect that choice-free constructive mathematics cannot
deal with inEnite-dimensional spaces. That, on the contrary, Hilbert spaces can well
be handled without countable choice has been shown recently by providing proofs of
unique existential statements such as
• the Riesz representation theorem [7, Theorem 3] and
• the fact that each point in a strictly convex normed space has a closest point to any
complete located subset [15, Theorem 6],
as well as of various results of approximative character (see also [18]).
Let us end with a quotation from the same source with which we have started our
considerations (Beeson [1, p. 25], footnote 16):
He [Bridges] wonders why this is. Logicians, is there a meta-theorem to explain
it [that constructive proofs are related with unique existence]?
We would like to extend Beeson’s question by asking for reasons why constructions
without countable choice seem to require unique existence or some turning to approx-
imate mathematics, reasons somewhat deeper than the mere indications we have tried
to substantiate in the foregoing.
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